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Summary  findings
Caprio and Honohan  examine why emerging markets, in  Certain well-worn messages  remain valid, but are
particular, are susceptible to and affected by firnancial  respected more in theory than in practice. There would
difficulties. They show that these difficulties have a  be fewer problems, the authors say, if there were:
richer, more complex structure than they are sometimes  * More diversification.
believed to have - with marked information  *  More balanced financial structures (for example, as
asymmetries and substantial volatility. The sources of  between debt and equity).
heightened regulatory failure in emerging markets in  More foreign banks in emerging markets'  financial
recent years include the volatility of real and nominal  systems.
shocks, the difficulty of operating in uncharted  territory  *  Better enforcement of both contracts and
after financial liberalization and other changes in regime,  regulations.
and the political pressures that can inhibit the  Participants in the financial sector will constantly try to
enforcement of prudential regulation.  get around rules that limit their profitability, so
Caprio and Honohan discuss what stronger regulation  regulation must be seen as an evolutionary struggle.
can and cannot accomplish, as well as options to improve  Prevention of financial failure is not costless, and a heavy
the incentive structure for bankers, regulators, and other  repressive hand is not warranted.  But a richer regulatory
market participants. They probe the shortcomings of a  palette can be used to protect financial systems more
regulatory paradigm that relies mainly on supervised  successfully  against crisis while preserving the systems'
capital adequacy and discuss the possible intermittent  growth-enhancing effectiveness.
application of supplementary "blunt instruments" as an
interim solution while longer-term reforms are being put
in place.
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Introduction
Hard on the heels of the 1994 Mexican crisis, the new wave of financial crises sweeping
across emerging economies since early 1997-starting in the miracle economies of East
Asia, then hitting Russia and later Brazil-has brought the fragility of banking and finance
into unprecedented focus.  Yet, just a few years ago, financial liberalization and financial
deepening were seen as a key pre-requisite for economic development (King and Levine
1993; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 1998). What has gone wrong?  For one thing, the
liberalization of financial markets has not been supported by adequate prudential
regulation of intermediaries.  The need for such a policy infrastructure, though denied by
some ideologues, has long been recognized by practitioners and theoreticians alike.  This
is because finance is prone to acute information asymmetries, because of economies of
scale in monitoring, and because of the severe negative externalities that can be entailed
in intermediary failure.  But policy enthusiasms, as well as the eroding pressures of
technology on existing regulations, meant that the rules governing markets were
dismantled faster than the needed prudential infrastructure could be put in place.
In this paper we look into the sources of widespread financial intermediary failure
focussing on the emerging markets of the developing and post-communist world where
the problems have emerged more acutely and more clearly than elsewhere.  The next
section reviews some of the factors behind crises in financial markets.  It examines why
emerging markets in particular are susceptible to and affected by financial difficulties,
and shows these difficulties to have a richer and more complex structure than is
sometimes believed, characterized by marked information asymmetries, the potential for2
political interference, substantial volatility, and the vulnerability of banking and finance
when structural economic changes create a new and uncharted operating environment.
We then turn to a discussion of options to improve the incentive environment in
financial systems, and a discussion of what stronger regulation can and cannot
accomplish.  The industrial countries converged on a regulatory paradigm relying mainly
on supervised capital adequacy.  We probe some of the shortcomings of this approach,
bearing in mind the lessons from developing country experience and discuss some
options that go beyond the standard paradigm.  These hope to improve the incentive
structure for bankers, regulators, and other market participants, effectively increasing the
number of concerned, skilled and watchful eyes.  We also discuss the possible
intermittent application of supplementary "blunt instruments", that could be useful
especially as an interim solution while longer-term reforms are being put in place.
The long history  of banking  problems  in developing  countries:
some highlights
The huge increase in private non-bank capital flows to the third world, starting
around 1990, should have given financial market participants from industrial countries a
new incentive to become aware of the fragility of third world financial systems. By and
large, however, they seem to have ignored until very recently the continuous history of
severe banking crises in developing countries over the past twenty years. '  Even a cursory
review of this history would have revealed the wider variety, greater frequency, and
relatively higher cost of systemic bank failures that is typical of small, low income
countries (Figure 1).3
One of the reasons why developing economies have done relatively badly on this
front is the particularly volatile environment in which banking has to operate in many of
these countries.  The other main reason has to do with political interference in banks or in
the process of bank regulation.
Volatility and the Boom in Bust Banks
Volatility
Dealing as they do in money, banks are especially vulnerable to nominal volatility
(inflation and exchange rate movements).  Econometric research has found nominal
volatility to be a significant contributory factor in crises.2  Measured, for example, by the
standard deviation of inflation (Figure 2), average nominal volatility in most regions of
the world over the past quarter century has been a multiple of that in the industrial
countries (as well as much higher than in previous decades).  To the extent that monetary
policy is under domestic control, nominal volatility can be seen as policy-induced.
Real volatility too is higher in developing countries (Figure 2), as has been
stressed by Gavin and Hausmann (1996), and here exogenous sources predominate.
Many developing countries are not only small but also undiversified, being dependent on
a narrow range of primary products as their main exports.  Sectoral or product-specific
supply or demand shocks can translate into sizable changes in the terrns of trade of an
undiversified economy, and into bankruptcy for export-dependent firrns and their
bankers.  Potential domestic purchasers of the assets of a distressed firm are, in an
undiversified economy, likely to be themselves distressed, a factor which depresses
collateral values just when they are needed.  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).4
Of particular importance is the volatility of external capital flows, sensitive not
only to host country conditions and prospects, but to source country lending opportunities
(Edwards, 1998). Correlated re-balancing of portfolios by international fund managers
can, as we have seen in East Asia and elsewhere, entail large inflows and sudden
outflows sufficient to swamp the domestic financial system of developing economies.
But here it is less clear that we are dealing with an exogenous factor.
Triggered as it was by the withdrawal of foreign funds, it would be easy to picture
the downturn in East Asia 3 as caused by an exogenous event.  But the banking systems of
the region could and should have been better positioned to help absorb even this huge
shock.  Instead, banking policies among other factors had encouraged the inflows and
ramped up the prior boom in real estate and equity prices.  And the weakness of the
banking systems may have contributed to the scale and timing of the outflow. 4
The debate over whether it was  fundamentals or  panic that brought down the
Asian financial systems should thus not be confused with the question of whether
underlying banking sector policy weaknesses contributed.  Although the domestic
banking system cannot easily be blamed for actually causing a panic, it had assumed
increased vulnerability.  Not only the weakened capital position of banks, but above all
their unhedged direct and indirect5 exposure to foreign exchange risk and to the risk of
property and equity market collapses, opened the door to a self-fulfilling panic. Liquidity
risk from the substantial dependence on short-term funding from foreign wholesale
sources also increased fragility; and the risk that any initial reverse would be
catastrophically amplified, was exacerbated by the high leverage of the corporate sector,
especially in Korea.  Finally, the lack of reliable financial information and trustworthy5
mechanisms for enforcing contracts (including bankruptcy procedures) made for severe
information asymmetries with the result that these countries became very vulnerable to a
sudden change in sentiment.
Volatile capital flows are always a risk factor for banks; but the Asian crisis
forces us to recognize how much bad banking can contribute to capital flow volatility (in
and out).  Far from providing a buffer against external volatility (in this instance coming
from a reversal in capital flows) the banking system in the affected Asian countries not
only exposed the economies to a self-fulfilling panic, but meant that the outflows would
cause acute macroeconomic consequences.
Exchange rate collapse
This endogenous boom-and-bust story is not, of course, unique to East Asia, but
echoes previous crises in industrial countries, where most episodes of widespread bank
failure have been characterized by over-exposure of banks to a real estate property boom,
itself fuelled by an over-expansion of bank lending. 6 Many of the more spectacular
earlier systemic failures in developing countries have also been of the boom-and-bust
type, albeit with property less prominent, and with the additional important twist of an
exchange rate collapse.
The three Southern Cone crises of 1979-82 were of this type, and they have been
among the most costly in proportional terms of the fiscal bail-out of bank creditors.  In
each case, a domestic borrowing and spending boom was fuelled by unrealistic
expectations about the sustainability of an exchange rate peg, and hence about the
ultimate cost of foreign-currency denominated borrowing.  When the exchange rate6
collapsed, unhedged banks and non-bank borrowers were made insolvent overnight, an
experience eerily resonant with more recent events.
It seems obvious that borrowers who believe in the stability of a developing
country's nominal exchange rate peg to the extent of incurring large unhedged
borrowings in foreign exchange are highly vulnerable. Nevertheless, this has been a
recurring cause of problems, not least in Mexico in the run-up to the 1994 devaluation,
when banks even had recourse to elaborate financial engineering designed to leverage up
their foreign exchange exposure in an evasion of prudential norms designed to limit such
exposure.  (Garber, 1998; Mishkin, 1997)
Where banks or their clients have unhedged foreign exchange liabilities, an
additional source of vulnerability is the consideration that the central bank's ability to
provide lender-of-last-resort facilities is in such circumstances limited.  Even if the
central bank believes that the domestic banking system is solvent at current exchange
rates, it has limited resources to finance a withdrawal of liquid foreign exchange deposits,
or of domestic currency deposits which are immediately converted to foreign exchange
(Fischer, 1999).  The Argentine crisis of 1989 represents a dramatic example of this
mechanism in action, (Beckerman, 1992, Giorgio and Sagari, 1996) as does the later
experience of 1994-95 in the same country (D'Amato, Grubisic and Powell, 1997),
though in that case the central bank's resources proved just sufficient.
Risk management in a brave new world.
To the extent that volatilily is a constant feature of developing economies,
bankers should have adapted to it. In practice, superimposed on normal volatility have7
been a succession of regime shifts altering the risk-profile of the operating environment
in hard-to-evaluate ways.
As developing country governments began to modernize and liberalize their
regulatory systems during the 1980s in line with prevailing intellectual fashions and
following the example of industrial countries, 7 many failed to realize the scale of the task
they had undertaken.  To be sure, there were many pressures that would have made it
either impossible or prohibitively costly to maintain the old regulatory barriers, but the
enthusiasm with which liberalization was adopted in many countries in the absence of
necessary institutional underpinnings brought the changes well beyond what was
unavoidable and into dangerous territory.
The dangers were particularly acute partly because of the lingering effects of
government and political interference, always more severe in countries with a small
political elite and in those where freedom of the press and an open democratic process are
not well developed.
As the governments withdrew, they left financial systems facing a largely
uncharted territory.  New owners and inexperienced bank supervisors (rarely receiving
the full backing of enforcement) at best tried to feel their way to an assessment of what
safe-and-sound banking would mean in practice -surely a fertile ground for excessive
risk taking or, given the asymmetries of information, outright looting (Akerlof and
Romer, 1993).
Financial liberalization is only the most conspicuous of the regime shifts that have
placed bankers in a "brave new world". Two contrasting examples are technological
changes in finance and communication and structural economic transformation (as in8
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union).  The era of miracle growth in East Asia
can also be seen as a regime to which financial systems react in what proved to be an
overly optimistic manner. 8 Without a track record of successful functioning under the
new regime, bankers have had a hard time judging just what constitutes sound banking in
the brave new world created by these regime shifts.
Political  interference  as an underlying  sources  of weakness
So far we have stressed banking and regulatory errors in the face of a more
volatile operating environment than had been allowed for.  But the role of government
and politics goes beyond technical errors in regulation and policy design.  Indeed, in a
remarkably high proportion of cases of widespread bank failure, the underlying cause has
been political interference in bank credit decisions, and/or in the enforcement of
prudential regulations designed to restrain self-lending or recklessness.
There are many ways in which government or political interference brought
banking systems to their knees.  Mlost  egregiously, some corrupt leaders simply helped
themselves to the resources of the banking system, as evidently happened in the
Philippines in the early and mid-1980s under the Marcos regime, and for which there are
many other examples, though mostly on a smaller scale.  More commonly, governments
leaned on banks - some of them state-owned - to make loans to priority sectors or
borrowers, not only directly undermining the banks' financial viability, but also eroding
the banks' incentive and ability to carry out loan appraisal or to build up credit appraisal
skills.  Often there was an implicit understanding that such loans would never be repaid.9
Sometimes the loans went to unpaid government suppliers, drawing the banks into a web
of non-payment and financial indiscipline.
The experience of many of the FSU banking systems in the years following the
break-up of the Soviet empire can also be partly interpreted in this way; and the plight of
large Russian banks in 1998-99, faced with a payment moratorium on their huge holdings
of domestic government bills, follows in the same ignoble tradition.
Even where directed credit was not the problem, other forms of arbitrary quasi-
taxation often undermined the banks' financial autonomy, by making them wholly
dependent on compensating quasi-fiscal concessions that would allow them to balance
the books.9 In such circumstances, each financial market participant is reduced to
hoping that somebody else will pay-up in the end.'0 The denouement often brings with it
a fiscal crisis.
Although failures have been reported more frequently following financial
liberalization (Demirgiiu-Kunt and Detragiache 1998), it would be misleading to
conclude that reliance on market forces in preference to detailed government direction of
credit was always the source of the failures.  Indeed, in many cases, a long-standing
underlying insolvency of the banking system has only been revealed as the banks
emerged from the sheltered environment that allowed them to cross-subsidize loss-
making lines of business, which they had been encouraged or instructed to maintain at the
behest of government, or of powerful politicians.  In such cases liberalization has
revealed the insolvency, rather than causing it.
Of course active intervention by a government in the credit decisions of banks is
fundamentally at odds with its role as prudential regulator and supervisor. Inadequacies10
in this latter role have been the other major aspect of political economy failure.  Here the
key is not so much technical deficiencies - though these are often present - but
enforcement in the face of political obstacles.  Weakness in this dimension has been
widely identified as a contributory problem in East Asia.  Certainly, comparative
assessments gave the affected Asian countries relatively low scores on the quality of the
regulatory environment prior to the crisis (Caprio, 1998), such as relatively weak
definitions of capital, easy loan classification and provisioning standards, low liquidity
requirements and little foreign penetration of the banking sector.  Furthermore, there is a
fairly clear correlation between the severity of recent banking crises and expert
assessments of the policy enviromnent  on dimensions such as legal protection of
property rights, corruption and law enforcement. Developing countries tend to score low
on these, as do the East Asia "miracle" economies, at least on the dimension of
corruption (Figures 3, 4).
Enforcement of prudential regulation is especially likely to be complicated by
political considerations where there is concentration of ownership and control of firns,  as
this typically entails concentration of political power.  (In addition, financial distress can
propagate through ownership links to affect the economy to an extent unfamiliar in larger
developed economies.)  As shown by a recent detailed study of over 3000 quoted firms in
nine Asian countries found that in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand, individual farnilies have control over the majority of corporations, with the use
of pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings and other devices enhancing the control of
even modest block shareholdings (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 1999, see also
LaPorta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998). There are not a few other countries11
where a handful of powerful families control large chunks of the banking system and the
economy, with family members at times well-placed in the finance ministry or other
agencies overseeing the banking sector.  II
The East Asia crisis thus confirms the message from other experience in
developing countries, that a strategy for prudential policy must address three main
weaknesses: the impossibility of fine-tuning bank safety margins in the uncharted
territory that is banking in the developing world; the need to provide insulation against
the large shocks to which these economies are prone; and the lack of enforcement that
results from the concentration of political power in many such countries.  Of course these
lessons are also relevant for industrial countries - but they are etched in strong relief in
the emerging economies.
Rigorous application of best industrial country regulatory practice will
undoubtedly help.  But developing countries need more. The greater background
volatility and the weaker incentive structure for regulation (including the political
pressures on regulators) both point to the need for innovative approaches to providing
better insulation and to mobilizing additional constituencies in favor of safe-and-sound
banking.  Furthermore, the lengthy lead time before the technical quality of regulation
can be brought to the necessary standards creates an urgent need for blunt, quick-acting
measures that might not form part of the optimal long-term or steady-state regulatory
design.  It is to these matters that we now turn.12
Re-thinking  Regulation
The rise of bank insolvency in emerging markets is leading not just to demands
for a new international financial architecture, but also recommendations for reform of the
domestic financial sector in developing countries in line with the strengthened procedures
of industrial ceuntries.  Certainly, in all industrial countries greatly expanded supervisory
teams now routinely make on-site inspections of banks as well as monitoring detailed
financial reports of banks on a regular basis.  The main reason is obvious: alarm on the
part of national authorities at the scale and frequency of bank failures since the 1970s. It
was not only the US Savings and Loan debacle. Each major industrial country has seen
embarrassing regulatory failures: the names Herstatt, Ambrosiano, Barings, BCCI,
Rumasa and Credit Lyonnais reverberate, not to mention the correlated Nordic collapses,
let alone Japan.  Despite this disappointing performance, application of industrial country
prudential standards is generally-and rightly-felt to be a pre-requisite for improvements
in the functioning of developing country systems; but what are these standards, and are
they enough?
A major early goal of the ]3asel Committee on Banking Supervision'2 was to
establish a level playing field for international banks in the face of intensified but un-
harmonized national regulatory regimes, though its famous risk-weighted minimum
capital percentage - albeit a compromise - has surely contributed to an increase in
average bank capitalization over the past decade. And the Committee's work allows us to
speak of an industrial country model of bank regulation, and it is to this model to which
many look as the solution to the problems of developing country banking systems.13
The centerpiece of the industrial country ("Basel") approach has been the
requirement that each bank should maintain a minimum of capital in relation to its risks, a
requirement that is supported by a supervisory procedure akin to, but going well beyond,
the audits to which non-financial firms are subjected. Notwithstanding this conceptual
simplicity, the Basel committee, and regulators generally, have had to work almost
continuously to refine and redefine the measure of risks, as well as having to cope with
ever-increasing difficulties of verification.  Part of the problem has been the evolving
complexity of financial market instruments, and the fact that a bank's position in such
instruments can change from moment to moment.  For this reason the recent trend has
been for industrial country supervisors to move to auditing of the bank's risk management
systems, rather than simply assessing the state of the balance sheet at a moment in time.
But there are other shortcomings to the "supervised capital adequacy" paradigm,
some related to the question of capital adequacy itself, others to the limitations of
administrative supervision.  Many of these shortcomings have been identified in the
theoretical literature,13 which began to evolve rapidly once micro economists interested in
regulation began to realize not only the points of common ground with other principal-
agent incentive structures, but also the challenging differences that arise in the regulation
of bank-like financial institutions.  Many have been confirmed in the field, not least in
developing countries.
"A capital  idea"...  or ideal,  more likely
It is hard to quarrel with the notion that capital would be a first buffer for loan
losses, providing some insulation against depositor losses. The idea that banks in which
owners have more funds at risk would behave in a more prudent fashion also has some14
plausibility.  But time and again we have seen the failure of banks with high reported
capital ratios.  Part of the problem is that, with conventional accounting concepts of
capital, what you see is not necessarily what you get. Better accounting can help -
indeed good accounting and provisioning practices are pre-requisites for this whole
approach - but each refinement of accounting practice typically makes more demands on
information.
Probably the most important accounting difficulty in measuring capital is the most
basic: how to determine a realistic value of the banks' loans.  After all, accounting capital
is essentially the residual value after subtracting other liabilities from total assets, of
which loans typically represent a large fraction.  A natural benchmark for valuing assets
could be the fair market value, and this is the way to go for marketable securities and
perhaps14  property.  But many loans are different: it is its private information about credit
quality that allows a bank to profit from lending; the asymmetric information thus
underlying much of the loan portfolio means that it could not be sold without
encountering severe 'lemons' problems.  Instead, some estimate must be made of
recoverable value.
Every banker knows that accounting provision should be made out of income to
establish a reserve against probable loan-losses.  In stable conditions, past experience can
provide a good guide to how big the provision should be, especially for routine consumer
and small business loans; and econometric models are routinely used (by banks that
really want to know) to project loan loss experience in industrial and some developing
economies.  But when economic conditions move out of the normal, or for the large or
unusual loans that are often the weak point of a reckless bank, past experience is no15
guide, even to the banker.  The high-risk environment and rapidly evolving economic
structure of most developing countries obviously exacerbates the severity of this problem.
Bank supervisors do try to classify loans into forward-looking categories such as
"normal", "especially mentioned", "sub-standard", "doubtful" and "loss". Realistically,
though, in the face of a resistant bank management and being on the light end of the
asymmetric information scales, supervisors often can do little more than insist on certain
provisions being made when the loan goes into arrears.  That is especially true if the
supervisory authority is under political pressure not to draw attention to problem loans
owed by prominent persons, groups, or their associates. As such, the accounting measure
of capital is often based on a backward-looking measure of loan quality that is unlikely to
give much early warning of health problems.
Too many bankers believe that their loans, like all the children of the proud
citizens of Lake Wobegon, are above average. As a result, they tend to under-provision.
If the bank has reached a reasonable measured capital adequacy ratio only because it
made no provisions against loan loss (P = 0 in the table) then we can safely say that its
true capital is below standard. Even an insolvent bank (with a true P of 10 or more) can
remain in business for months or even years provided it does not run out of cash. As long
as the net inflow of deposits and the interest received on performing loans are sufficient
to pay operating expenses and interest on deposits, closure can be deferred.16
Table 1. Balance Sheet of the First Bank of Lake Wobegon
Assets  Liabilities
Cash:  10  Demand deposits:  100
Liquid investments:  20  Other debt:  30
Loans at historic value:  100
Less  Provision for loan losses:  -P
Property:  10  Capital:  10-P
Depositors and supervisors may be lulled into a false sense of security if accounting rules
are flouted.  Accounting rules in some countries still have some way to catch-up here.
For example, if interest on a loan is in arrears by more than 90 days, accounting standards
in many countries will forbid the bank from showing that interest as accrued in its income
statement; but in Thailand interest accrual on non-performing loans was allowed for up to
360 days in 1997. And in most countries it is still more difficult to prevent a bank from
concealing a non-performing loan simply by making a new loan to cover the repayment-
a practice known as 'evergreening.'  This may all sound obvious, but at times of
widespread financial distress, the need for corporate financial restructuring tends to blur
sound banking and accounting practice.  When the alternative is to declare the insolvency
of the bank, bankers' loan valuation can take on a more-than-usually optimistic flavor,
and supervisors are hard-pressed to know with confidence where to draw the line.  The
supervisor's problem is even worse if the bank insiders have abandoned any attempt to
maximize the bank's value, and have started looting its resources through self-lending or
even fraud.  Concealment will then be the main goal of the bank's relation with the
supervisor.
Even if the problem of measuring capital were solved, we would be left with
issues of risk and quality.  Gaining nothing from the up-side risks, the regulator is more17
concerned than the shareholder with risk of failure: accordingly, regulatory capital will
tend to be higher than that which would be chosen by the bank, whose response may well
be to increase the risk of its portfolio (for a simple illustration, see  Calomiris, 1997).
Regulators have not ignored this risk amplification, though first attempts to adjust for risk
have been remarkably simplistic - for example often ignoring covariance between
different assets in arriving at portfolio risk and applying arbitrary rule-of-thumb weights
to different assets (e.g. residential mortgages = half the credit risk of commercial loans). 1 5
A very recent (June 1999) proposal of the Basel Committee is to employ the
assessment of private credit rating agencies to establish appropriate risk-weightings to be
attached to different loans for the purpose of computing risk-weighted capital adequacy.
This may reduce the critique that banks are at the mercy of arbitrary regulators'
judgements, but is not a clear  step forward: as the Committee itself acknowledges, the
agencies have had a limited and mixed record in respect both of country risk and the
credit-worthiness of corporate borrowers in the developing world.  The potential for
leveraging portfolio risk is highest for market instruments and derivatives, and here the
tendency has increasingly been to employ statistical models based on historic covariances
and concepts such as "value at risk", essentially measuring lowest percentiles of the
probability distribution.  This is a sound approach if its limitations are recognized, as is
not always the case. As already mentioned, overly mechanical risk management systems
have been blamed for some of the international contagion that has occurred in the past
few years, and historical asset-price correlations have proved to be less stable than some
investors had counted on.16 But the speed with which positions, and therefore risk, can
be changed makes direct supervision of the market risk of a bank's  portfolio beyond the18
scope of conventional procedures.  Short of having continuous electronic surveillance of
a bank's position, supervisors have to fall back on assessing the bank's risk management
systems and procedures.
An alternative for the bank shareholder to increasing risk is reducing the quality
of capital.  If the shareholders have borrowed the capital from another bank (or,
improperly, from their own bank) they may have much less at stake. Pyramid ownership
structures can likewise have the effect of lowering the system-wide share of capital while
preserving the measured capitalization of each bank.  This kind of behavior has caused
problems in several countries - Chile (early 1980s) and Mexico (1994) being well-
documented cases of borrowed capital - and is often difficult to detect and even more
difficult to prove, especially in countries in which close business or family links make
arms length transactions less common.  It illustrates yet another reason why the paradigm
of "supervised capital adequacy" provides less protection than may appear.
It would be absurd to deny that ensuring adequate capital is a central goal for
bank supervision - and in high-risk environments a margin of safety is even more critical.
But all too often neither bank capital, nor the risks it supports, can be reliably measured.
In developing countries the situation is worsened by severe information asymmetries,
shading into concealment and worse, often by politically powerful bank insiders,
combined with the heightened risk environment and uncharted conditions that prevail.
Reinforcements for the supervisors
Supervisors, then, are faced with information problems and pressures to forbear
from enforcement.  Often they are underpaid and demoralized, and this needs to be met
with an incentive structure for supervisors more likely to elicit the kind of performance19
which the paradigm of supervised capital adequacy took for granted. But the incentive
structure needs to extend further: if bank supervisors are the lone rangers, some of the
livestock will be lost and some stolen. Ensuring that bankers themselves have a strong
incentive to keep the bank safe and sound is one part of this program. New approaches,
some already being applied, also envisage co-opting other market participants by giving
them a greater stake in bank survival. By multiplying the watchful eyes in this way, not
only is the likelihood of early problem detection increased, but (especially where public
opinion can also be mobilized) the political pressures are side-tracked.  (Caprio, 1997,
World Bank, 1998a).
(i)  Incentives for the supervisors
Bank supervisors are generally paid less than bankers and the gap seems'7 to be much
larger in emerging markets, where financial liberalization and the arrival of high-wage
foreign banks have often had the effect of greatly increasing remuneration in the private
financial sector.  As a result not only do developing country supervisory agencies have
greater difficulty in retaining skilled supervisors, but the opportunity for outright bribery
is greater, as well as the possibility of a nice deferred bonus, in the form of a future job,
for light supervision.  Bonding regulators (Kane, 1995) through deferred bonuses, with
losses deducted, would improve their incentives, but likely would be infeasible, at least
for the present; significantly raising supervisory compensation, where it is a mere fraction
of market salaries, likely is a necessary condition for improvements here.
Working both to upgrade skills and improve compensation are important
initiatives, and the latter in particular meets political resistance in many countries; even
the costly banking crisis in Japan has not yet clearly produced a change in the amakudari,20
or 'descent from heaven' system, according to which regulators move to senior posts in
banking.  Authorities may attempt to ban future employment in the banking sector by
supervisors, at least for a number of years, to reduce the likelihood of deferred
compensation with poor incentive properties.18 However, without higher compensation
for supervisors, this will more likely make it even more difficult to attract capable staff,
and merely increase the pressure for corruption during an official's career.
Although many may scoff at the ability of government supervision to be effective,
the empirical evidence on this score is divided.  Some (Berger, Davies, and Flannery,
1998) find that supervisory assessments in the United Stated appear to add value
regarding the current condition of banks, but in predicting future performance are less
accurate than bond and equity market assessments.  However, a recent study, also for the
United States (Flannery, 1998) shows that current bank examiner ratings, which are
supposed to remain secret, help predict subsequent assessments in the subordinated debt
market.  Improving supervisory capacity thus appears to be important, and given that the
pay gap is relatively narrow in the U.S. case, suggests that success in the compensation
area may be key as well.
Supervisors' incentives to enforce the regulations can perhaps also be enhanced
by reducing the discretion to forbear.'9 This mandated "prompt corrective action" is a
potentially powerful tool against political pressures, though it remains somewhat
controversial inasmuch as it removes a flexibility to circumstances that could be useful. 20
Moreover, prompt corrective actions, like U.S. accounting standards as the S&L crisis
was becoming evident, can easily be shelved, all the more so when ownership of banks
and corporations is concentrated.  A crucial element here is to ensure that regulators have21
adequate legal protection against law suits brought, for example, by aggrieved owners of
intervened banks.  The risk for a regulator of incurring personal liability even in the
performance of official duties is a real one in many emerging markets, and has a chilling
effect on regulatory intervention.
If informed public opinion is intolerant of bad banking and critical of undue
regulatory forbearance, the political pressures that inhibit enforcement will abate.  Some
progress is being made on this front, including at the international level, but there is still
much scope for enhancing the flow of reliable information and public awareness.
(iii)  Incentives for the bankers
We have already noted that increased regulatory capital need not increase the
bank shareholder's real stake in the business, let alone that of the bank insider.  Only
when staying in business is the best option does the bank stand much chance of survival.
For this reason, the incentives facing bank decisioninakers have received increased
scrutiny, with the essential idea being that regulation should be incentive-compatible,
thereby overcoming some of the problems posed by asymmetric information.  There are
both carrots and sticks involved. The franchise value of the bank, i.e. the prospective risk-
adjusted value of future profit flows, is not fully captured by the usual accounting, but it
is key to bankers'  incentive.  Damaged by taxation and quasi-taxation and enhanced by
restrictions on entry, increasing franchise value is an objective that has to be tempered by
other considerations, including consumer welfare and budgetary needs, but achieving an
adequate franchise is a pre-requisite for sound banking.
Nostalgic folk note that limited shareholder liability is one thing that has
encouraged banks to assume excessive risk taking, as bank owners face unlimited upside22
gains with limited losses. In addition to theoretical support for this notion (Stiglitz),
historical evidence has emerged that U.S. banks that faced enhanced liability in the 19'h
and early 2 0th century behaved more conservatively that those with limited liability (Esty,
1996). Increased liability for bank directors (as for other company directors) has been a
legislative trend in several countries, among which New Zealand, where it applies under
specific circumstances (e.g. disclosure of incomplete or erroneous information).
And in industrial countries, there is growing interest in a pre-commitment
approach toward regulation (Kupiec and O'Brien,  1997), according to which bankers
agree with supervisors on the models and procedures they will use to evaluate their risks,
and are subject to penalties for violating these procedures.  More generally, the approach
that is adopted by the authorities to resolving one crisis sets the scene and signals the
incentives to bankers for avoiding future incidents - if that is, the models are reliable and
the penalties reliably applied.
(iii)  Incentives for bank claimants
Wherever there is implicit or explicit deposit insurance, bankers possess the
option to 'put' their insured deposit liabilities to the taxpayers. 2'  Without such insurance,
the bank would decide on its capital and risk position with an eye to outsiders' ability to
monitor that risk, and the price that outsiders will charge the bank for additional funds;
even with some insurance, there is evidence that depositors do monitor banks, perhaps
because the credibility of the deposit guarantee falls into question (Martinez-Peria and
Schmukler, 1999). If 'the market'  suspects that a bank is taking risks significantly in
excess of the norm,  then the interest rate that the bank must pay to attract funds
presumably would rise, leading it to curtail its activities.  A goal of some new23
approaches has been to restore this discipline of private creditor monitoring and to
increase the private production of information (rather than merely decreeing that
transparency should be increased).  This can be done by requiring banks to issue debt
which is subordinate to all other claims bar equity capital. As well as providing an
additional private buffer that will be drawn on before the taxpayers' funds, and
establishing a new set of concerned watchful eyes, such a requirement can, through the
market price of this debt, provide a useful signal of market participants'  assessment of the
health of the bank. 22 A scheme along these lines was initiated in Argentina in 1997; it
specifies that the holders of the subordinated debt should be entities of substance which
are independent of the bank's shareholders, and it requires issue of the debt in relatively
lumpy amounts on a regular basis (Calomiris, 1997). As Kane (1995, p. 454) notes, "Just
as coal miners watch canaries to warn them of bad air in a mine shaft, taxpayers can
watch the changing value of obligations issued by coinsuring private sureties to alert
them if and when the accounts of government sureties begin to emit unhealthy aromas."
Subordinated debt holders will demand better information and disclosure.  Also to
make sure that they monitor banks effectively, effort has to be devoted to ensure - such
as by Calomiris'  (1997) suggestion that they be required to issue abroad -- that they are at
arms length from the banks who issue the paper.
Not only can subordinated debt help by forming a core of well-motivated and
presumably informed monitors, who in effect can become the next generation of bank
owners for institutions whose current generation fails, but it also provides a better balance
between government and market monitoring.  As mentioned, correcting this imbalance is24
particularly important in developing countries due to the greater concentration and
therefore higher likelihood of political interference
Into the unknown
Reaching even further beyond the supervised capital adequacy paradigm to find
mechanisms that can work well in risky and unproven territory, regulatory thinking has
begun to reassess the merits of liquidity requirements as well as intermittent blunt
controls that can in some circumstances prove useful.
Of course it may be possible to reduce volatility as well as provide insulation.
Opening the domestic banking market to ownership by reputable foreign banks can also
serve to lay-off the risks of the domestic banking environment. Following New Zealand
along this line, most conspicuous is Argentina, where about 45% of bank assets are in
majority foreign-owned banks. Thailand has also partially relaxed its hitherto restrictive
policy in this regard, and other countries are beginning to follow suit; the resolution of
the Texas bank crisis, years earlier, followed this same course, though the 'foreigners'
spoke the same language.  In a sense, by importing reputable foreign banks, developing
countries are getting safe- and sound-banking - or at least better diversification - for
free. 23 Of course, foreign banks are no panacea, and populist fears that they would
neglect the domestic small business borrower cannot entirely be allayed.
Another way to decrease volatility is to increase the size of the market.  The
economic volatility suffered by many smaller developing countries (as documented
above) is partly because of their small economic size. To take one example, the GDP of
the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa is no bigger than that of Pennsylvania.  Or consider that
200 million people live in some 50 countries each of whose total money supply is less25
than one billion dollars 24 Banks constrained to lend locally will routinely fail without
enormous capital or substantial liquidity - just like unit banks' failure in the nineteenth
century.  Enlarging markets, such as by regional banking systems, or by letting banks
from one country branch abroad or hold foreign securities, can lessen the volatility of
their portfolios, though against this must be set foreign exchange risks, and the
heightened problems of asymmetric information in many aspects of cross-border
banking.  In effect one can question whether small countries should attempt to have their
own free-standing financial system at all.
Liquid reserve requirements have been a somewhat neglected insulator in recent
years.  Reserve requirements have been progressively lowered in developing countries
and elsewhere (Williamson and Mahar, 1998). The neglect is due partly to new
techniques and fashions that have made them redundant in their former role as a fulcrum
for aggregate monetary policy, and partly because their quasi-fiscal use as a means of
taxing banks and channeling funds to favored sectors and favored borrowers has rightly
been seen as highly distorting and destructive.  But eligible assets need not be confined
(as they often used to be) to interest-free deposits at the central bank or other special
instruments carrying below-market yields. Although liquid assets in no way offset loan
losses, funds invested in risk-free liquid assets do at least represent a part of the portfolio
that is not subject to significant credit risk. 25 These requirements are significantly easier
to monitor, and forbearance can more easily be detected.  They can be put in place fairly
quickly in a growing system.  And they do provide some protection against depositor
runs or contagion that prevents the bank from rolling over its non-deposit wholesale
funding.26
Looking again at the balance sheet of the Wobegon bank of the previous section,
we see that it could not easily withstand a failure to roll-over its bonds: to be safe against
that risk, it should have chosen a more liquid portfolio. 26 Here again Argentina has been
to the fore in imposing high liquid reserve requirements on its banks.  But this is certainly
because of the currency board rules that have been imposed on the Central Bank, severely
restricting its authority to make liquidity loans.  In this case the banks' holdings of liquid
assets were crucial in enabling Argentine banking system to survive a 20% deposit
outflow in the Tequila crisis of 1994-95 without abandonment of the currency board
arrangement. Now liquidity ratios in Argentina, some of them (up to 80 %) held off-
shore, amount to about 30 per cent of the system's deposits, and have continued to
provide insulation through the market turbulence of 1997-99.
In the brave new world faced by developing economy banking systems, all of the
refinements that have been proposed may not be enough, or they may be in part
impractical.  While the needed systems are being developed, and until the risk
environment and banking practice settles down, there can be a case for introducing or
keeping some blunt instruments that would be too distorting in the long run, but which
protect from acute failures.  Many of the mechanisms that are considered under this
heading were used in industrial countries in the past, though often not primarily for risk-
reduction purposes.  They could include various forms of control or tax on foreign
borrowing or capital inflows, ceilings on deposit interest rates - preventing reckless
competition by unsound banks from destabilizing the whole system - and speed limits on
the growth of bank balance sheets, or on the growth of credit to high risk sectors such as
real estate.  Such ceilings could have contributed to lessening or eliminating recent27
crises if they had been effective.  But experience shows that, if they are continuously
constraining, such ceilings are soon evaded and as such might appear to have little chance
of success.  For example, bankers who want to lend to real estate can book the loan to a
shell intermediary or even set up a nonbank intermediary of its own to do this business.
And side payments in cash or kind have been a popular way of evading interest ceilings.
Still, blunt instruments do not have to be 100% effective, or even continuously
binding, but rather merely have to slow the expansion where a bubble economy is
emerging, while the govermment  is upgrading other regulatory tools.  If the ceilings are
set in such a way as to bind only occasionally when the risks are highest, then they could
be effective.  Indeed, like the signal sent by the price of subordinated debt, when
relatively high interest ceilings become binding, or moderate lending limits are tested, a
powerful signal is sent for authorities to concentrate supervisory effort.  Given the
scarcity of such skills, blunt instruments should then be regarded as a tool in the
regulatory arsenal.  Even the relatively sophisticated Argentine authorities, for example,
force banks to hold added capital as their lending rates rise above prime interest rates, a
crude way to estimate the credit risk being assumed.  Eventually, as the authorities and
banks become better skilled in implementing a model-based approach to evaluating credit
risk, this formula may be abandoned, but for now it contributes to the safety of the
system.  Identifying which intermittent blunt instruments can work well in which
circumstances seems likely to be a fruitful area for further research (Honohan and
Stiglitz, 1999).28
Concluding  remarks
Intermediaries in an ideal financial system will allocate fumds  shrewdly to a well-
diversified mix of projects yielding high private (and social) returns without exposing the
intermediary to a disproportionate risk of failure.  Such a financial system serves as an
absorber, rather than a magnifier of economic disturbances.
It is impractical to think in terms of an unregulated system for delivering this
result, but recent regulatory failures certainly suggest that we are well below optimum
performance in this regard.  The sources of heightened regulatory failure in recent years:
volatility of real and nominal shocks, the difficulty of operating in uncharted territory
following regime changes such as financial liberalization, and the political pressures that
can inhibit enforcement of prudential regulation, are all present in a heightened form in
developing countries, and it is there that the most recent wave of collapses has occurred.
But it is not only in these countries that a strengthening of prudential tools is needed.
Emerging market authorities have to cope, at least for the time being, with the
current system in which large real and financial disturbances - either from domestic or
foreign sources - threaten with some regularity.  Tightening the regulation of domestic
financial systems appears warranted, a course that already has been followed by some
countries that experienced severe financial crises in the 1980s.  Problems that loom
particularly large in emerging markets both argue for a re-thinking of conventional
approaches to government interventions in this key sector and point the way to specific
paths to follow in adjusting the regulatory environment.
At the same time, some well-worn messages remain valid and are respected more
in theory than in practice.  Thus, problems would be fewer if there were: more29
diversification, more balanced financial structures (for example as between debt and
equity), the presence of foreign banks and, above all, better enforcement of both
regulations and contracts.
Because financial sector participants will constantly attempt to get around rules
that limit their profitability, regulation must be seen as an evolutionary struggle.  Some of
the new approaches that are only now beginning to be applied will have a limited life
before the regulated entities find ways of nullifying their effect.  Regulatory innovation
will remain a constant challenge.
It would be easy for the pendulum to swing too far; to neglect the benefits of rapid
economic growth supported by liberal and innovative financial systems.  The set-backs in
East Asia are very far from wiping out the huge improvements in prosperity in those
countries.  One does not have to factor-in the plausible Olsonian gains that can arise in
post-crisis institutional renewal to believe that if the current correction was a price that
had to be paid, it was one well worth paying. Prevention is not costless and a heavy
repressive hand is not warranted. Yet we believe that govermnents can do better: that a
richer regulatory pallet can be used to protect the financial system more successfully
against crisis while still preserving its growth-enhancing effectiveness.30
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Figure 1: Mean Fiscal Cost of Banking Crises
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Note:  Cost estimates are based cii Caprio and Klingebiel (1997), Honohan (1997) and  Lindgren,
Garcia and Saal (1996).35
Figure  2:  Volatility by Region 1970-97
Standard deviations of growth and inflation as multiple of industrial countries
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Note:  The mean (median)  for each group of countries of the historical standard deviations of GDP growth
and inflation is expressed as a multiple of that for the industrial countries.  Source: International Financial
Statistics.  Country groups represented are the East Asia "Miracle" countries, South Asia, other East Asia,
Mid East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa.36
Figure 3:  Quality of Administration by Level of Development
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Figure 4:  Quality of Administration and Recent Crises
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Notes
'Caprio and Klingebiel  (1997),  Honohan  (1997)  and Lindgren,  Garcia  and Saal (1996)  provide
comprehensive  accounts  of banking  crashes  in developing  countries  that pre-date  the East Asia
crisis; figure 1 is based on this experience. The total fiscal cost of these crashes  was estimated  at
$250 billion in mid-1996;  for comparison,  one recent  estimate  puts total loan-losses  in the four
worst-affected  Asian countries  at $130 billion  (Armstrong  and Spencer,  1998). By 1996,  early-
warning  systems such  as that proposed  in Honohan  (1997)  and based  on previous  experience
were flagging  each of the Asian  economies  that subsequently  experienced  banking  crashes,
though all such prediction  or alarm systems  have a very high incidence  of false positives  (cf.
Demirgici-Kunt  and Detragiache,  1999).
2 The pressure  placed on Brazilian  banks  by a climate  of price  stability after 1994  following.years
of high and volatile inflation  provides  an instructive  exception  to the general  rule that instability
is bad, but an excellent  if somewhat  paradoxical  example  of the effects of regime  change
(discussed  below).
3 The sequence  of events  in the East Asian crisis is recounted  in numerous  sources,  e.g. Alba et
al., (1998a,b),  BIS (1998),  IMF (1998),  World  Bank (1998b)  and their interpretation  has been  the
subject  of a large literature,  see Mishkin  (this symposium).  Alba et al. (1998b)  in particular
consider  the role of volatility  in the crisis.
4 Bumside  et al (1998)  develop  a model in which  the revelation  of future  fiscal costs of a banking
system bail-out  causes the authorities  to abandon  a currency  peg, in order  to avail of future
seigniorage  financing.
s Onlending  in foreign  exchange  to a corporation  which itself is uncovered  is almost as risky for a
bank as being  uncovered  itself.
6 The intriguing  endogenous  dynamics  of these phenomena  have been  long-discussed  in the
literature  (Fisher, 1933,  Kiyotaki  & Moore, 1997).  The link with property  booms  can be traced
back  to some of the largest  crises of the late 19t'  century,  but these cases  - in Italy, Argentina,  and
even  Australia  -- were small  in cost relative  to current  crises, notwithstanding  the higher degree
of capital  mobility  in the earlier  era (Calomiris,  forthcoming).
7 The agenda  included  removal  of administrative  controls  on interest  rates, bank-by-bank  credit
ceilings,  rules for the allocation  of credit  to preferred  sectors  or borrowers  and limits on new
entry.
8 The novelty  of the stable  exchange  rate (tablita)  regimes in place in the run-up to the Southern
Cone crises of the early 1980s  provides  a good example  of a false sense  of security  being  created
by policy  change.
9Argentina  had brought  this to a fine art by the late 1980s  with an elaborate  system of automatic
monetary  compensation  payments  being  operated  by the central  bank  to eliminate  the adverse
effect on bank profitability  of controlled  lending  rates and forced  investment  in unremunerative
official  paper. Speculation  against  the currency  in 1989  resulted  in this arrangement  spiraling  out
of control  as, in an attempt  to stem deposit  outflows,  banks raised  deposit  rates to over 100  per
cent per month,  knowing  that they  would receive  full compensation  in subsidies  from the central
bank. (This system terminated  in the Bonex  plan of January 1990  which entailed  the confiscatory
funding  of most bank deposits).  Beckerman  (1992),  Giorgio  and Sagari  (1996).
10 The  widespread  bank insolvency  in the African  Franc Zone in the late 1980s  was very much of
this type,  with the additional  complication  of speculative  outflows  resulting  from overvaluation  of
the exchange  rate peg (it had endured  for half a century). In the Franc  Zone each government
hoped that the multinational  central  banks might pick up the tab, or failing that, the foreign
strategic  shareholders  of the local banks  or - ultimately  - the French government. In the event,
these  hopes proved  not to be wholly  unfounded.39
lCould the fact that regulators  held off intervening  a large failing  bank in Venezuela  in 1992
have had something  to do with official's ownership  share in that bank? The eventual  bill for the
resulting  systemic  crisis was of the order of $7 billion.
12 The Basel  Committee  comprises  senior  bank regulators  from 12 industrial  countries. Their
landmark 1988  agreement  on capital  adequacy  requirements  for international  banks  was only the
first in a series of accords  governing  common  banking  standards. In 1997,  the Basel  committee
published  a document  setting  out "Core  Principles"  for bank supervision. This was much  less
detailed,  but of broader  scope,  and is supposed  to present  guidelines  for developing  and transition
economies,  many of which have  indeed  subscribed  to the Principles.
13 Extensive  reviews  of the formal  theoretical  literature  are in Dewatripont  and Tirole (1994),
Freixas and Rochet  (1997)  and Bhattacharya,  Boot and Thakor  (1998).
14 Though  conservative  accounting  rules often  prohibit  a bank marking  its property  to market
price if higher  than book.
15  The famous Basel  8 per cent capital is as a percentage  of risk-weighted  assets,  with risk
weights equal  to or less than unity, and therefore  it corresponds  to a lower unweighted
percentage. Additional  capital loading  is required  for market risk, recognizing  that, although
long-term  government  bonds  attract a zero credit-risk  weighting  in the Basel  scheme,  fluctuations
in their market price  can in reality  make them highly  risky for banks.
16 For an account  of the problems  encountered  in this area  by the hedge fund  LTCM, see Michael
Lewis,  "Surprises  in the Aisles of Fund Supermarkets,"  New York Times,  January  24, 1999.
17 A World  Bank survey  is at present  verifying  this point.
18 Some senior supervisory  officials  in the United States  are banned  from banking  jobs for one
year.
19 The U.S. Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act (FDICIA)  of 1991
embodied  prompt corrective  action and structured  early intervention,  mandating  certain
supervisory  actions as banks' net worth deteriorates,  and was the response  to the regulatory
forbearance  that characterized  the S&L debacle  (see Kane, 1989,  Barth, 1991).
20 The abrupt  closure  of 16 small  banks in Indonesia  in the middle of the crisis in October  1997
arguably  intensified  the panic and prompted  bank runs. Some see this as an excuse  for
forbearance;  but it has equally  been argued  that there was still  too much forbearance,  and that
there would have  been less panic had the closures  been  more  widespread  and credibly  final.
21 Few countries  have  made any attempt  to vary deposit  insurance  premia  with assessed  risk; there
is a variation  in the US but, as shown by Berger  et al., the variation  is very modest.
22 It's not a panacea,  of course,  and the details matter:  many  failed S&Ls  in the United States  had
uninsured  debt on their books. However,  it is possible  that the price of subordinated  debt  was
already  discounting  the regulatory  forbearance  that was occurring  in the 1980s,  and indeed  that
the debt holders  were assuming  that they  would  have been  bailed out. Also, there was no cap on
the interest rate on this debt nor, since it was not a regulatory  requirement,  was there any
mechanism  to ensure  that debt holders  were at arms length  from the issuing  banks. Lastly,  as
noted  by Dewatripont  and Tirole, the interests  of holders of sub-debt  do not exactly  coincide  with
those of the depositors  or the public interest  more  widely,  which is both why they should  be part
of the monitoring  of banks  but also why  they can only be one component  of this process.
23 Though  the many African  countries  that welcomed  the notorious  BCCI in better times might
not view it that way.
24 Roughly  the size (we note) of the World  Bank's staff credit  union.
25 As such, high liquidity  requirements  go some  way towards  the narrow-banking  model
advocated  by some. Note however,  that there can be some disappointments  here if assets prove to
be less risk-free  and liquid than banks  were counting  on.40
26 In theory,  the central  bank could  meet the situation  through  the lender  of last resort facility,  but
as already mentioned  its room for maneuver  can  become  quite circumscribed  when bank runs  and
pressure  on the exchange  rate coincide.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2214 Trade Policy  and Market  Access  Constantine  Michalopoulos  October  1999  L.  Tabada
Issues  for Developing  Countries:  36896
Implications  for the Millennium
Round
WPS2215 Implementation  of Uruguay  Round  J. Michael  Finger  October  1999  L.  Tabada
Commitments:  The  Development  Philip  Schuler  36896
Challenge
WPS2216  Corruption  and  Trade  Tariffs,  or  Roberta  Gatti  October  1999  R. Gatti
a Case  for Uniform  Tariffs  38735
WPS2217  Border,  Border,  Wide  and  Far,  David  C. Parsley  November  1999  H. Sladovich
How  We  Wonder  What  You  Are  Shang-Jin  Wei  37698
WPS2218  Who  Avoids  and  Who Escapes  Wlodzimierz  Okrasa  November  1999  S. Fallon
Poverty  during  the Transition:  38009
Evidence  from Polish  Panel  Data,
1993-96
WPS2219  The Effect  of the United  States'  Emiko  Fukase  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Granting  Most  Favored  Nation  Will Martin  36896
Status  to Vietnam
WPS2220  A Quantitative  Evaluation  of  Emiko  Fukase  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Vietnam's  Accession  to the ASEAN  Will Martin  36896
Free  Trade  Area
WPS2221  The  Dynamics  of Poverty  and  the  Wlodzimierz  Okrasa  November  1999  S. Fallon
Effectiveness  of Poland's  Safety  38009
Net (1993-96)
WPS2222  Labor  Market  Integration  in the  Maurice  Schiff  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Presence  of Social  Capital  36896
WPS2223 Integrated  Financial  Supervision:  Michael  Taylor  November  1999  S. Torres
Lessons  from Northern  European  Alex  Fleming  39012
Experience
WPS2224 Growth  Forecasts  Using  Time  Series  Aart Kraay  November  1999  R. Bonfield
and Growth  Models  George  Monokroussos  31248
WPS2225  How  Did Highly  Indebted  Poor  William  Easterly  November  1999  K. Labrie
Countries  Become  Highly  Indebted?  31001
Reviewing  Two  Decades  of Debt Relief
WPS2226  Money,  Politics,  and a Future  for the  Michael  Klein  November  1999  M. Salehi
International  Financial  System  37157Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2227  The  Sri Lankan  Unemployment  Martin  Rama  November  1999  S. Fallon
Problem  Revisited  38009
WPS2228 Fiscal  Contingency  Planning  for  Patrick  Honohan  November  1999  A. Yaptenco
Banking  Crises  38526
WPS2229  Do School  Facilities  Matter?  The Case Christina  Paxson  November  1999  N. Schady
of  the Peruvian  Social  Fund  Norbert  Schady  88247
(FONCODES)
WPS2230  Bankruptcy  Organization  through  David  Hausch  November  1999  L.  Tsang
Markets:  Auction-Based  Creditor  S. Ramachandran  80516
Ordering  by Reducing  Debts
(ACCORD)
WPS2231  What's  Behind  Mercosur's  Common  Marcelo  Olarreaga  November  1999  L.  Tabada
External  Tariff  Isidro  Soloaga  35555
L. Alan  Winters
WPS2232  Market  Access  Advances  and  J. Michael  Finger  November  1999  L.  Tabada
Retreats:  The Uruguay  Round  and  Ludger  Schuknecht  35555
Beyond
WPS2233 User's  Guide  to an Early  Warning  Santiago  Herrera  November  1999  C. Garcia
System  for Macroeconomic  Conrado  Garcia  87969
Vulnerability  in Latin  American  Countries
WPS2234  The  Green  Revolution  and  the  Rinku  Murgai  November  1999  M. Fernandez
Productivity  Paradox:  Evidence  from  33766
the Indian  Punjab
jp.w 